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Abstract
Background: Youth with conduct problems (CP) often make decisions which value self-interest over the interests of others.
Self-benefiting behavior despite loss to others is especially common among youth with CP and callous-unemotional traits
(CU). Such behavioral tendencies are generally measured using self- or observer-report. We are unaware of attempts to
measure this tendency with a behavioral paradigm.
Methods/Principal Findings: In our AlAn’s (altruism-antisocial) game a computer program presents subjects with a series of
offers in which they will receive money but a planned actual charity donation will be reduced; subjects decide to accept or
reject each offer. We tested (1) whether adolescent patients with CP (n=20) compared with adolescent controls (n=19)
differed on AlAn’s game outcomes, (2) whether youths with CP and CU differed significantly from controls without CP or CU,
and (3) whether AlAn’s game outcomes correlated significantly with CP and separately, CU severity. Patients with CP and CU
compared with controls without these problems took significantly more money for themselves and left significantly less
money in the charity donation; AlAn’s game outcomes were significantly correlated with CU, but not CP.
Conclusions/Significance: In the AlAn’s game adolescents with conduct problems and CU traits, compared with controls
without CP/CU, are disposed to benefit themselves while costing others even in a novel situation, devoid of peer influences,
where anonymity is assured, reciprocity or retribution are impossible, intoxication is absent and when the ‘‘other’’ to be
harmed is considered beneficent. AlAn’s game outcomes are associated with measures of CU. Results suggest that the
AlAn’s game provides an objective means of capturing information about CU traits. The AlAn’s game, which was designed
for future use in the MRI environment, may be used in studies attempting to identify the neural correlates of self-benefiting
decision-making.
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Introduction
Youth with conduct problems (CP) often make decisions which
appear to value self-interest over the interests of others. For example,
several criteria for the clinical diagnosis of conduct disorder involve
taking at the expense of others: i.e., stealing with or without
confrontation, forced sex, and lying for goods or favors or to avoid
obligations. Such self-benefiting behavioral tendencies are generally
measured by self- or observer-report. Although we are unaware of
behavioral paradigms which seek to measure this tendency toward
self-benefiting actions in youth with conduct problems, some
behavioral measures of altruism require subjects to weigh the
interests of others against self-interest [1]; for example, Harbaugh et
al. [2] asked subjects to decide whether to donate to a charity (a local
food bank), despite a cost to themselves; some trials were voluntary,
while others mandated donations, akin to taxation. Moll et al. [3]
examined decisions to donate, or oppose donation, to a series of
charities. Some decisions were costly-to-subjects and others were
non-costly. These games, although of great interest, did not measure
taking for self at the expense of others. The Dictator Game requires
one subject to decide on a split of money between the ‘‘dictator’’ and
anotherplayer[4,5].Thussubjectsmaymakemoreself-benefitingor
other-benefiting decisions. Here, building from that important work
on altruism, we sought to develop a game which could be used in
future fMRI studies and where subjects repeatedly decided whether
ornot to pursueactionsthatresultinself-benefitwhilecostingothers.
Any behavioral measure of tendency toward antisocial behavior
problems must contend with the following: (1) youths may develop
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through various etiologies; and, (2) youths with CP represent a
heterogeneous group [6,7]. This heterogeneity may be reduced by
focusing on CP youths with callous and unemotional (CU) traits,
as these traits apparently identify an important subgroup of
antisocial youths [7]. It’s important to note that CU and CP are
associated, but distinct traits. Many youths with CP have CU but
some do not. Similarly, many youths with CU have CP but some
do not.
Among youths with CP, CU is associated with expectation of
more instrumental gain and positive consequences from aggressive
actions together with decreased expectancies of negative conse-
quences of deviant behavior [8,9]. CU traits predict more severe
CP and aggression, persistence of symptoms [6], future violent
behavior and poorer treatment outcomes [10]. Many longitudinal
studies now demonstrate relatively high stability of CU ratings
throughout childhood, from childhood into adolescence, and from
late adolescence into young adulthood [11]. Some work also
supports that individuals with CP and CU traits demonstrate less
emotional empathy or positive affect, [8], and exhibit deficits in
emotional processing [12] and moral reasoning [13]. Because of
these emotional deficits, it is hypothesized that such youth,
throughout development, are less able to learn from others’
responses to their actions, thereby impacting conscience develop-
ment [14]. Perhaps because of this poor emotional responsivity,
these individuals are less likely to constrain behaviors which harm
others [13]. CP with CU is highly heritable, while CP alone is only
moderately heritable [15]. Thus, among youth with CP, CU traits
appear to identify a particularly severe and persistent subgroup of
individuals who may possess a more biologically-based and less
environmentally-influenced trait. Thus, self-benefiting behavior
despite cost to others may be especially common among CP youth
with CU. Such work underscores the importance and potential
value of measuring CU traits in studies of adolescent antisocial
phenotypes and considering youth with CP and CU separately
from youth with CP without CU in some analyses.
Decisions to choose self-benefiting behaviors despite harm to
others may be due to a number of situational or dispositional
factors. These include social reinforcement and peer influences
[16], situational anonymity or lack of concern for reputation [17–
19], perceived likelihood of retribution or reciprocal altruism
[20,21], substance intoxication [22], characteristics of the ‘‘other’’
to be helped or harmed [23,24], and opportunity. We designed
and tested a new paradigm, the AlAn’s (altruism-antisocial) game,
in which subjects accept or reject a series of offers that include
both benefit to self and cost to others, for determining whether
youths with CP are disposed toward self-benefiting behaviors that
harm others, even in a novel situation, without peer influences,
where anonymity is assured, reciprocity or retribution are
impossible, intoxication is absent, when the ‘‘other’’ to be harmed
is considered beneficent, and opportunity is equal across all
individuals. We tested (1) whether a disposition to benefit oneself at
a cost to others differs between adolescent patients with CP and
adolescent controls (between-group analyses), and (2) whether
behavior on the AlAn’s game correlates with CP severity
(dimensional analyses). Because our paradigm requires decision-
making where subjects weigh self-interest against other’s interests,
and because of the extant literature underscoring that youth with
CP and CU traits demonstrate less emotional empathy, we further
tested (3) whether youths with CP and CU differ significantly from
controls without CP or CU (between-group analyses), and (4)
whether behavior on the AlAn’s game correlates with CU trait
scores. In very early game development, debriefing showed that
many individuals (non-clinical) deemed as appropriate accepting
trials in which benefit to the player exceeded loss to a charity.
Therefore, we also hypothesized that CP patients would especially
differ from controls in trials that involved large losses to a charity
and small rewards to the player.
Materials and Methods
Participants
After Colorado Multiple IRB approval, twenty adolescent
patients (15 male) were recruited through a university-based
adolescent treatment program. Patients are generally referred to
treatment through social services or criminal justice agencies.
Previous publications support that most of the patients admitted to
this program have both conduct disorder and substance
dependence by DSM-IV criteria [25]; treatment focuses on both
these disorders, utilizing behavioral approaches, family-based
therapy and medications for comorbid disorders such as
depression. Nineteen control adolescents (15 male) were recruited
through flyers, advertisements in school newspapers and a market
research company. Written informed consent (parents) and assent
(adolescents) was obtained from all research subjects. Inclusion
criteria for both groups were: 1) age 14–18 years, 2) primary
language is English, 3) reading proficiency adequate to understand
consent, 4) not mentally retarded, 5) not threatening or dangerous,
6) no physical illness that would exclude participation, 7)
adolescent and all first degree relatives have never worked, or
volunteered for, or received assistance from the Red Cross, and 8)
parent or guardian has adequate English proficiency to provide
informed consent and complete the written questionnaires.
Recruitment of control subjects was monitored to assure controls
had similar age, sex, racial and ethnic distributions to patients and
that controls lived in a zip code from which patients are usually
referred. Exclusion criteria for controls were: 1) history of court
conviction for offenses other than minor traffic or curfew
violations, and 2) history on pre-evaluation screening of sub-
stance-related treatment or substance-related expulsion from
school.
Table 1 shows that patients and controls (Section 1) and
separately patients-with-CU and controls-without-CU (Section 2)
did not significantly differ in terms of age, sex, race, ethnicity or
socioeconomic status. The average age for both groups (patients
and controls) was about 16 years, about three-quarters were male,
two-thirds Caucasian, and about 15% Hispanic.
Measures
Measures in the study assessment battery included:
(1) A measure of socioeconomic status (SES) modified from
Hollingshead & Redlich [26]: this measure has been used in
our previous studies [25] and utilizes parent-reports of the
primary wage earner’s education and occupation; both of
these variables are assigned a rank of 1–7 according to
categories, and then ranksa r ew e i g h t e da n ds u m m e d
according to procedures previously described, yielding a
range of scores from 11–77, with 11 representing the highest
SES [26].
(2) The Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) [27]: this parent-report
assessment is standardized by gender and for ages 4–18 and
provides dimensional ratings of conduct problems in children.
CBCL was included as one of our two measures of severity of
conduct problems.
(3) The Youth Self Report (YSR) [28]: this self-report assessment
produces dimensional ratings of conduct, attention, and
affective problems, with excellent reliability and validity, and
AlAn’s Game, CP and CU
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are standardized by gender and age. The YSR has shown
discriminative validity for conduct problems [29] and was
included, along with CBCL, as a measure of severity of
conduct problems.
(4) The Inventory of Callous and Unemotional Traits (ICU) [30]:
the ICU has been validated in adolescent offenders [31] and
in large non-referred samples [32]; many longitudinal studies
now support the reliability of ICU ratings throughout
childhood and from childhood into adolescence [11]. This
self-report instrument provided one of our two measures of
callous-unemotionality (range 0–72).
(5) The Antisocial Process Screening Device (APSD) [33]: this
20-item self-report instrument, based on the Psychopathy
Checklist-Revised [34], identifies more severe and chronic
juvenile offenders [35]. Confirmatory factor analyses support
a 3-factor structure, including dimensions of narcissism,
impulsiveness and callous-unemotionality [36]; this last
subscale provided our second measure of callous-unemotion-
ality (CU subscale range 0–12).
(6) The Social Desirability Scale (SDS) [37]: this instrument was
included to assess whether groups varied in their tendency to
provide apparently socially desirable, rather than internally
motivated, responses.
Procedures
A study research assistant met with the adolescent subject and
parent during Meeting 1. Following informed consent, parents
completed the CBCL [27], a race/ethnicity questionnaire, and a
measure of socioeconomic status [25,26]; adolescent subjects
completed the YSR [28], provided a urine sample for onsite drug
testing (iCupH, Instant Technologies, Inc., Norfolk, VA) and a
breath test for alcohol (Alco-Sensor III
TM, Intoximeters Inc., St.
Louis, MO).
Approximately 3–7 days later, eligible subjects completed
Meeting 2 in a quiet private room, chosen by the subject, in the
subject’s home, a public facility (i.e. library), or our research
offices. Subjects again provided urine and breath samples for
onsite drug and alcohol testing. Then they viewed an investigator-
produced ninety second slide presentation with pre-recorded
messages highlighting the positive contributions of the Red Cross.
After viewing the slides, subjects indicated how much good they
felt the Red Cross does by marking on a line anchored by the
terms ‘‘No good at all’’ and ‘‘Lots of good’’ (Red Cross Visual
Analogue Scale). Subsequently, subjects viewed the AlAn’s game
instructions (slides with pre-recorded audio; instructions are
included in Material S1), and then answered questions about the
game to ensure comprehension of the instructions. All participants
played a short practice version of the game to familiarize them
with the timing and format of the game. We told all participants
that we would hold research data in strict confidence. Subjects had
the opportunity to ask questions or to replay the practice game.
Then subjects played the AlAn’s game, which takes approximately
31 minutes. By protocol, seating arrangements ensured that the
laptop screen was only visible to the subject. After finishing the
game, subjects completed a short debriefing interview and then
several self-report measures including: the Inventory of Callous-
Unemotional Traits (self-report) [30]; the Antisocial Process
Screening Device (self-report) [33]; and the Social Desirability
Scale [37]. Qualitative data from our debriefing interviews
supported that subjects were generally engaged by and understood
the AlAn’s game. Four research assistants administered the study
protocol; each conducted a similar proportion of patient and
control interviews.
Description of the AlAn’s (Altruism/Antisocial) Game
This game shares some similarities with previous tests of
altruism [1–3] or behavioral economic games [4,5]. However, the
AlAn’s game differs from such games in several fundamental ways.
First, in altruistic acts the actor gives up something to benefit others
[38]. In contrast, many antisocial acts take something from others to
benefit the actor; therefore, in the AlAn’s game we offered subjects
the opportunity to take some benefit despite expense to another.
Second the game was designed to be quantitative, allowing
between group comparisons of outcomes. Subjects started with no
money; a planned, real donation to the Red Cross started at $16
but could decrease due to choices made by the participant playing
the game. Subjects were told that the researchers would (and they
did) give the Red Cross the value of the charity donation
Table 1. Between group comparisons – demographics.
Section 1: Section2:





Demographics: Age (years) 15.9 (0.99) 15.7 (0.75) 0.56 15.9 (0.83) 15.8 (0.77) 0.55
Sex: male 75.0% (15) 78.9% (15) .0.99
a 78.6% (11) 75% (12) .0.99
a
Race White 65.0% (13) 68.4% (13) 0.82
b 64.3% (9) 68.8% (11) 0.80
b
African American 15.0% (3) 15.8% (3) 7.1% (1) 12.5% (2)
Other/mixed race 20.0% (4) 15.8% (3) 28.6% (4) 18.8% (3)
Hispanic 15% (3) 16% (3) .0.99
a 14.3% (2) 18.8% (3) .0.99
a
SES 41.7 (12.23) 35.3 (11.39) 0.10 41.6 (12.83) 36.6 (12.02) 0.29
Section 1- all patients (n=20) and all controls (n=19); Section 2 – subset of patients with callous unemotional traits (CU) and controls without CU; mean (sd) or % (n).
Abbreviations: Cts=controls; CU=utilizing questions 3,5,6 and 8 from the ICU we determined whether subjects would qualify for the Callous and Unemotional
Specifier for Conduct Disorder recently proposed for inclusion in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual-V (DSM-V); NoCU=not meeting the Callous and Unemotional
Specifier; Pts=patient; SES=socioeconomic status.
Footnotes:
aFisher’s Exact Test;
bdue to small cell sizes, comparison is of whites vs. all others.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036158.t001
AlAn’s Game, CP and CU
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e36158remaining at the end of the game. Based on previous studies which
have demonstrated differences between hypothetical and actual
valuations [39–41], we designed AlAn’s game to use actual money
donations to a real charity. Third, we designed the game for future
use in the fMRI environment; for example, we included many (72)
decision-making trials and also trials which may be used as a
contrast in MRI designs (Calculation Trials). Finally, we utilized a
single charity, which we hypothesized would generally be
considered beneficent; this single ‘‘other’’ standardized the
experience across subjects.
We carefully considered whether to utilize a second participant,
or a real person who was not a research participant, instead of a
charity; empathy and perspective-taking generally are conceptu-
alized as a between-individual, and not person-charity, phenom-
ena. However, we opted to use a charity for these reasons: (1) given
that empathy can vary based on how similar the ‘‘other’’ is to one’s
self (i.e. ingroup vs. outgroup), we worried that failure to
appropriately match the ‘‘other’’ to the research participant would
introduce error (i.e. subject made more self-benefiting choices
because he considered the other player to be very dissimilar to
him, rather than because of an inherent tendency toward
antisocial behaviors); and, (2) some of our adolescent patients
may use manipulation or threats of aggression in interpersonal
interactions, or may address grievances through violence. Thus,
we worried about pairing adolescent patients together or with
controls while playing a game requiring choices that pit self
interest against the interests of others. Although paradigms have
been constructed where two participants remain anonymous to
one another, and even to the researchers [4], we wanted research
participants to view the ‘‘other’’ as beneficent and deserving, given
that increasing the perceived ‘‘deservingness’’ of the other in
economic games increases the quantity of donations from
experimental subjects [5]. Thus, we chose to utilize a single
charity that we thought would be broadly viewed as beneficent, to
standardize the experience across subjects.
Subjects were told directly that the researchers were interested
in understanding how people make decisions when they can win
but others will lose. No attempts were made to deceive subjects
and no cover story was utilized. Instead subjects were informed
that there were no ‘‘right’’ or ‘‘wrong’’ answers while playing the
game and that all information about how they played the game
would be held in strict confidence; we would not inform parents
about how subjects played the game, and for patients we would
not inform treatment providers.
Subjects made 144 choices (‘‘trials’’) divided into two 72-trial
sessions. Each trial was approximately 13 seconds in length (see
Figure 1): 5 seconds to view and consider the offer, 1 second to
press an ‘‘accept’’ or ‘‘reject’’ computer key, 4 seconds to observe
results, and 2–4 seconds of a gray fixation screen. The ‘‘results’’
portion of each trial showed the outcomes of the choice; analogue
‘‘thermometers’’ and digital counters showed the subject’s accrued
money and the current remaining value of the Red Cross
donation.
The AlAn’s game contained three trial types (See Figure 2).
During Active Trials (‘‘AT’’ in Figure 2.A) the decision screen
showed an amount that the subject would gain (range 2–64 cents)
and the Red Cross would lose (same range) if the choice were
accepted (‘‘Change both thermometers?’’); in most trials the two
amounts were unequal. Subjects accepted (‘‘Yes’’ button) or
rejected (‘‘No’’ button) the choice on the screen; after rejected
choices neither counter changed. Attention-Control Trials (‘‘A’’ in
Figure 2.A) have a correct or logical answer. We assumed that
most subjects would reject all trials in which both they and the Red
Cross would lose money, so these trials forced changes if a subject
fell into a repetitive pattern of accepting all offers (to maximize
earnings). Conversely, we assumed most subjects would accept all
choices in which they would get money and the Red Cross
donation would not be reduced, so these trials forced changes if a
subject fell into a repetitive pattern of rejecting all offers (to prevent
any loss to the Red Cross). These trials also objectively tested
Figure 1. AlAn’s game trials: screen-captures with associated timing (example Active Trial shown). Note: A. An offer in which the subject
will receive 32 cents and the Red Cross donation will be reduced by 8 cents (5 seconds); B. When the red ball turns green, subjects have one second
to press one computer key to accept the offer, or a different key to reject it; C. The thermometers and counters then show how much money the
subject has accrued. Here the subject accepted so the ‘‘You’’ counter now reads 32 cents and the ‘‘Red Cross’’ counter reads $15.92); D. Gray fixation
screen.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036158.g001
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ask, ‘‘Is the YOU number bigger?’’ while presenting one positive
number for the subject and another for the Red Cross. Subjects
were instructed to press the YES button if the subject’s number
(the ‘‘YOU’’ number) was bigger than the Red Cross’ number,
and the NO button if the subject’s number (the ‘‘YOU’’ number)
was not bigger than the Red Cross’ number. These trials assessed
whether patients could, in 6 seconds, understand relative numer-
ical values used in the Active Trials. In addition, the AlAn’s game
was designed for future use in the MRI environment which further
motivated inclusion of multiple Calculation Trials. Calculation
Trials, compared with Active Trials, present the same visual cues,
require the same motor responses, and require subjects to judge
the relative numerical values but are devoid of self vs. other
consideration. Thus they may serve as a comparison for Active
Trials in future MRI studies. Each of the two sessions contained 36
Active Trials, 6 Attention-Control Trials and 30 Calculation Trials
(72 per session, 144 total). The order of amounts offered (order of
trial presentation) was randomized before the beginning of the
study and was the same for all subjects.
Subjects received $15 for their time and effort. To provide real
monetary consequences to their within-game decisions, they were
given their earnings from the game (Active and Attention-Control
Trials). Money left to the Red Cross in the game actually was
donated to the Red Cross. To incentivize attention to Calculation
Trials, subjects received $0.25 if they correctly answered at least
75% of the Calculation Trials. Subjects were paid in cash at the
end of Meeting 2.
Data Analyses
The AlAn’s game, programmed in EPRIME (EPRIME V2.0,
http://www.eprime2.eu/), provided output files with all variable
names denoting trial type and choices made by each participant.
We double entered self-report measures into a Microsoft Access
database, imported both AlAn’s game and self-report data into
SPSS [42], and checked for inconsistencies.
Between-group analyses (patients with CP vs. controls
without CP). We compared patients and controls for demo-
graphics (age, sex, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status) to ensure
between-group similarity. We also compared groups for the Inventory
of Callous and Unemotional Traits (ICU), Antisocial Process
Screening Device (APSD), Red Cross Visual Analogue Scale, Social
Desirability Scale, and CBCL/YSR DSM-oriented conduct problems
T-scores, utilizing independent t-tests and chi square tests or their
nonparametric equivalents (Mann-Whitney U and Fisher’s Exact
tests, respectively) when variables violated normality assumptions.
To test whether the AlAn’s game could discriminate between
patients and controls several strategies were employed. First, using
Figure 2. The AlAn’s game: description of three trial types. 2.A: Matrix with ‘‘You Gain’’ values (Y axis) and ‘‘Red Cross Loses’’ values (X axis) in
cents. Each cell in the matrix represents a single offer. AT=active trials; arrow from AT points to a screencapture showing a sample active trial in
which ‘‘You’’ will get 2 cents but the Red Cross donation will decrease by 64 cents. Note that the ‘‘You’’ amount varies independently from the ‘‘Red
Cross’’ amount. A=Attention-Control; trials in which either a ‘‘Yes’’ results in a loss for both subject and Red Cross (top row of matrix), or a ‘‘Yes’’
results in gain for the subject and no loss for the Red Cross (first column of matrix); arrow from A points to a screencapture showing a sample
Attention-Control trial in which ‘‘You’’ will lose 2 cents and the Red Cross donation will decrease by 32 cents. Note: Thicker borders indicate the
quadrants for which percentage of ‘‘Yes’’ responses across those 9 Active Trials were calculated (see Materials and Methods, Data Analyses, Between-
Group analyses). 2.B: C=Calculations, in which subjects decide whether the ‘‘You’’ number is bigger than the Red Cross number; arrow points to a
screencapture showing a sample calculation trial in which the ‘‘You’’ number (4 cents) is not bigger than the ‘‘Red Cross’’ number (8 cents).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036158.g002
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differences in AlAn’s game outcomes: ‘‘You’’, the amount of
money taken for oneself while playing the game and ‘‘RC’’, the
amount of money left in the charity donation at the end of the
game. Second, to visually examine within-group behavior by trial
characteristics (i.e. for each cell in Figure 2.A), we calculated the
percent of trials accepted for each combination offered in Active
Trials (e.g. You get 2 cents and Red Cross loses 64 cents) within
patients and separately, within controls; the game presented each
choice to each subject twice. Next, we calculated patient-control
group differences in percent of trials accepted for each Active
Trial. We hypothesized that patients would accept significantly
more relatively-costly-to-Red-Cross trials (i.e. large Red Cross
subtractions and small rewards to self) than would controls. Trials
on the right side (Figure 2.A, columns 5–7; e.g. You Get 8 cents,
Red Cross donation decreases by 64 cents) are relatively more
costly to Red Cross, and those on the left side (Figure 2.A, columns
2–4; e.g. You Get 8 cents, Red Cross donation decreases by 2
cents, Figure 2.A) are relatively less costly to Red Cross. To
evaluate statistically the relationships between Red Cross loss and
self (‘‘You’’) gain, we divided Active Trials into two levels by
magnitude of loss to Red Cross (‘‘Low’’ -2 to -8; ‘‘High’’ -16 to -32)
and into two levels by magnitude of gain to ‘‘You’’ (‘‘Low’’ 2 to 8;
‘‘High’’ 16 to 32), creating a ‘‘Red Cross loss’’ and ‘‘You’’ gain
effect, respectively, and creating four quadrants of active trials:
upper left (small ‘‘You’’ gain, small Red Cross (RC) loss), upper
right (small ‘‘You’’ gain, large RC loss), lower right (large ‘‘You’’
gain, large RC loss), and lower left (large ‘‘You’’ gain, small RC
loss). For each subject, we calculated percentage of ‘‘Yes’’ answers
for the 9 active trials comprising each quadrant and evaluated
them as repeated measures in a mixed model ANOVA. Fixed
effects included a between subject effect of group (patient, control)
and within-subject effects of Red Cross loss (low, high) and ‘‘You’’
gain (low, high) with a random effect of subject nested within
group. The repeated measures on subject (averaged within
quadrant) were assumed to have an unstructured covariance
structure. Interactions among effects were evaluated with a
manual step-down (backward regression) procedure where the
most non-significant higher-order term was removed and the
model was re-run, beginning with removal of the highest-order
three-way interaction term: group*Red Cross loss*‘‘You’’ gain.
Likelihood ratio tests and minimum values for Akaike’s Informa-
tion Criterion (AIC) determined the best model [43].
Between-group analyses (patients with CP and CU vs.
controls without CP or CU). Because CU traits identify a
subgroup of youth with CP with severe and persistent antisocial
behavior [11], investigators commonly divide CP and control
youth into those with and without CU traits [6,44–45]. Although
some investigators use a median split or other techniques for
dividing samples based on CU severity, we chose the following
approach: we utilized questions 3, 5, 6 and 8 from the ICU and
recoded responses on a 0–3 scale with 3 indicating greater callous-
unemotionality; items 3, 5 and 8 are positively worded items,
requiring reverse scoring. For each of the 4 items, a score of 2 or 3
was sufficient to meet that criterion and subjects had to meet at
least 2 of the 4 criteria to meet the callous-unemotional specifier.
Although other approaches have been utilized, we are only aware
of one standard method for identifying CU traits which was
recently proposed for the DSM-V [46]. We followed those
proposed procedures here because (1) we are unaware of other
standardized methods of categorization of CU traits and (2) given
that this approach may be incorporated into DSM-V, in the future
it is likely to be broadly utilized by clinicians and researchers. Most
patients (n=14/20) met requirements for the CU specifier and few
controls did (n=3/19). Between-group analyses described above
(paragraphs 2 and 3 of this section) were also completed to
compare patients with CU traits (n=14) and controls without CU
traits (n=16).
Dimensional analyses. To assess the relationship between
AlAn’s game outcomes and CP and CU measures, we computed
Spearman’s rank-order correlations between total AlAn’s game
earnings (‘‘You’’), the ending Red Cross donation (RC), YSR and
CBCL DSM-oriented conduct problems T-scores, Antisocial
Process Screening Device (APSD) scores, and scores on the
Inventory of Callous and Unemotional Traits (ICU). Correlations
were also completed for other APSD and ICU subscales and
although not presented, are available to interested readers upon
request. Regression analyses were employed to investigate the
relationship between ICU total score (dependent variable) and
AlAn’s game (independent variable; percent of ‘‘Yes’’ answers to
Active Trials). The initial model included ICU total score, AlAn’s
game and group (patient vs. control). Additional covariates
(internalizing and externalizing problem scores from the CBCL,
age, sex, socioeconomic status, race (white vs. other) and ethnicity
(Hispanic yes vs. no) were added to see if covariates explained the
observed relationship between ICU and AlAn’s game.
AlAn’s game performance: Finally, to test for group
differences in the ability to understand and play the AlAn’s game,
we evaluated group differences in performance on Attention-
Control Trials (attention to the task) and Calculation Trials (ability
to determine relative numerical values).
Results
Between-Group: Comparing Patients with CP vs. Controls
without CP
Table 2 (section 1, columns 4–6) shows that patients scored
significantly higher than controls on measures of callous-
unemotional traits. Patients and controls did not differ on their
Red Cross Visual Analog Scale, in which subjects were asked to
rate ‘‘How much good do you think the Red Cross really does?’’;
each group averaged about 85 (100 indicating ‘‘Lots of good’’)
confirming that the Red Cross was viewed positively in both
groups. As expected, patients scored significantly higher than
controls on parent-rated and self-report measures of conduct
problems (both p,0.001).
Table 2, Section 1, also shows that patients and controls did not
differ significantly on overall AlAn’s game outcomes (‘‘You’’ or
amount of money taken for self while playing the game; p=0.32;
and, ‘‘RC’’ or the amount of money left in the charity donation at
the end of the game; p=0.19). Figure 3 presents a ‘‘heat’’ map of
percent of accepted offers by trial characteristics within group
(patients 3.A and controls 3.B – note actual percent values are
provided in Figure S1). Figure 3.C shows the difference for each
cell (patient group minus control group; 3.A–3.B). Our hypothesis
was that patients, compared with controls, would make more
choices which resulted in relatively low self-benefit and large cost
to others. That general pattern of patient-control difference can be
seen visually in Figure 3.C. We divided Active Trials into four
quadrants: upper left (small ‘‘You’’ gain, small Red Cross (RC)
loss), upper right (small ‘‘You’’ gain, large RC loss), lower right
(large ‘‘You’’ gain, large RC loss), and lower left (large ‘‘You’’ gain
and small RC loss) and calculated percentage of ‘‘Yes’’ answers for
each quadrant for each subject. Mixed model analysis of variance
(ANOVA) evaluated statistically the relationships between Red
Cross loss (low, high) and ‘‘You’’ gain (low, high) on percentage of
‘‘Yes’’ answers in each quadrant. The final model included group
(F1,39=1.71, p=0.1991), Red Cross loss (F 1,117=72.00,
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Cross loss (F 1,117=3.49, p=.0641). From this model, subjects
averaged 84.0 percent ‘‘Yes’’ responses to active trials with high
‘‘You’’ gain compared to 55.9 percent ‘‘Yes’’ responses to active
trials with low ‘‘You’’ gain. Controls and patients both averaged
greater than 80 percent ‘‘Yes’’ responses when Red Cross loss was
low (80.6, 85.1, respectively); when Red Cross loss was high,
controls averaged 49.1 and patients averaged 64.9 percent ‘‘Yes’’
responses to active trials. While ‘‘You’’ gain and Red Cross loss
values were significant in the model, groups did not differ
significantly in their behavior.
Between Group: Comparing Patients with CP and CU vs.
Controls without CP or CU
Following the example of others [6,44,45], we divided groups
based on severity of CU; we selected patients with, and controls
without, the CU specifier proposed for inclusion in the DSM-V.
We then repeated analyses described above (in the previous
paragraph). Table 2 (section 2, columns 7–9) shows patients with
CU traits (n=14) and controls without CU traits (n=16) were
similar for Red Cross Visual Analog Scale, and the Social
Desirability Scale scores. On the AlAn’s game, patients with CU
(Table 2, section 2) took significantly more money (p=0.04) and
left significantly less money in the charity donation (p=0.01) when
compared with controls without CU. Figure 3.D–E shows
acceptance rates by trial characteristics for patients with CU
(3.D) and controls without CU (3.E); Figure 3.F shows patients
with CU minus controls without CU (i.e. 3.D minus 3.E). Both
groups accepted similar numbers of offers with high self-benefit
and relatively little cost to others (small reductions from the charity
donation); but patients with CU accepted more offers than
controls without CU (Figure 3.F) when self-benefit was small and
deductions from the charity donation were large. For example,
patients with CU accepted about 57% of trials in which they
would get 2 cents and the Red Cross donation would be reduced
by 64 cents; controls without CU accepted about 13% of those
trials (see Figures 3.D and 3.E; also see Figure S1). Finally, for
patients with CU traits vs. controls without CU traits, a mixed
model ANOVA (n=30) evaluated statistically the relationships
between Red Cross loss (low, high) and ‘‘You’’ gain (low, high) on
percentage of ‘‘Yes’’ answers. The final model included group
(F1,30=6.86, p=0.0137), Red Cross loss (F 1,90=71.12, p,.0001),
‘‘You’’ gain (F 1,90=75.34, p,.0001), group*Red Cross loss
(F 1,90=11.05, p=.0013) and group*‘‘You’’ gain (F 1,90=8.11,
p=.0055). When Red Cross loss was low, controls averaged 77.0
and patients averaged 88.9 percent ‘‘Yes’’ responses; when Red
Cross loss was high, controls averaged 40.0 and patients averaged
72.0 percent ‘‘Yes’’ responses. When ‘‘You’’ gain was low, controls
averaged 40.0 and patients averaged 70.6 percent ‘‘Yes’’
responses; when ‘‘You’’ gain was high, controls averaged 76.6
and patients averaged 89.1 percent ‘‘Yes’’ responses. Thus, as both
‘‘You’’ gain increased (low to high) and Red Cross loss decreased
(high to low) subjects were significantly more likely to accept trials.
Patients with CU traits, compared with controls without CU traits,
significantly differed in their behavior (main effect); group
differences become more apparent in the upper right quadrant
where ‘‘You’’ gain is low and Red Cross loss is high (interactions
are significant in the model).
Dimensional: Associations of AlAn’s Game with CP, and
separately CU
Table 3 presents correlations of the amount of money left in the
charity donation (RC) after playing the AlAn’s game with the YSR
DSM-oriented conduct problems T-scores and the CBCL DSM-
oriented conduct problems T-scores. Those correlations were non-
significant. Results for ‘‘You’’ (i.e. AlAn’s game earnings) were
similarly uncorrelated with these CP measures.
Table 3 also presents correlations between RC and measures of
CU (i.e. score derived from the full ICU scale and from the APSD
callous subscale); we highlight results for RC but ‘‘You’’ (i.e.
Table 2. Between group comparisons: callousness and AlAn’s game.
Section 1: Section2:
Pts (n=20) Cts (n=19) p-value Pts-CU (n=14)
Cts-NoCU
(n=16) p-value
CU-measures ICU 30.5 (9.68) 23.4 (7.10) 0.01* 33.7 (9.63) 21.5 (4.98) ,0.001*
APSD Callous 4.9 (1.31) 3.2 (1.44) 0.001* 5.1 (1.41) 2.8 (1.05) ,0.001*
Other measures: Red Cross VAS
a 84.6 (17.52) 85.4 (11.63) 0.74
b 88.1 (10.52) 86.4 (10.61) 0.64
b
Social Desirability Scale 15.0 (5.56) 15.8 (5.22)
c 0.58 14.4 (5.43) 15.9 (5.42)
c 0.45
CPCBCL 77.0 (8.41) 53.3 (4.19) ,0.001* 77.4 (8.77) 53.6 (4.46) ,0.001*
CPYSR 69.8 (7.29) 55.2 (5.18) ,0.001* 71.4 (5.76) 55.4 (5.25) ,0.001*
AlAn’s game
Outcomes:
You $13.9 (2.45) $12.8 (3.14) 0.32
b $14.1 (2.73) $12.2 (3.06) 0.04
b*
RC $6.4 (4.62) $8.7 (5.28) 0.19
b $5.4 (4.43) $10.2 (4.35) 0.01
b*
Section 1- all patients (n=20) and all controls (n=19); Section 2 – subset of patients with callous unemotional traits (CU) and controls without CU; (mean (sd);
*p,0.05);
Abbreviations: APSD=Antisocial Process Screening Device; CPCBCL=Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-oriented conduct problems scale T-score from the CBCL;
CPYSR=Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-oriented conduct problems scale T-score from the Youth Self Report; Cts=controls; CU=utilizing questions 3,5,6 and 8 from
the ICU we determined whether subjects would qualify for the Callous and Unemotional Specifier for Conduct Disorder recently proposed for inclusion in the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual-V (DSM-V); ICU=Inventory of Callous and Unemotional Traits; NoCU=not meeting the Callous and Unemotional Specifier; Pts=patient; RC=ending
Red Cross donation; VAS=Visual Analogue Scale; You=money taken for self while playing the AlAn’s game;
Footnotes:
aSubjects are asked ‘‘How much good does the Red Cross do?’’, scale is measured from 0–100 with 0=‘‘No good at all’’ and 100=‘‘Lots of good’’;
bMann-Whitney U test;
c2 control subjects did not complete all questions on the SDS and were not included in these analyses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036158.t002
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For both groups combined, RC significantly and negatively
correlated with measures of callous-unemotional traits; subjects
with higher CU scores tended to leave less for the Red Cross.
Similarly, within the control group, RC significantly and
negatively correlated with measures of CU; within patients the
RC-CU relationship was also negative, albeit smaller in magnitude
and nonsignificant.
To further explore and confirm these results, we conducted
multiple regression analyses to test whether the relationship
between AlAn’s game and ICU total score was explained by
important covariates (n=39 subjects); The relationship between
Figure 3. ‘‘Heat’’ maps showing percentage of ‘‘Yes’’ Answers in A, B, D and E. Figure 3.C, F, Group differences in acceptance of AlAn’s
Game offers. Legend: Matrix with ‘‘You Gain’’ values (Y axis) and ‘‘Red Cross Loses’’ values (X axis) in cents. Each cell in the matrix represents a single
offer. The first column and top row of the matrix are Attention-Control Trials (see Methods). For each cell, each subject’s percent of ‘‘Yes’’ responses
was calculated across the 2 sessions. Those values were entered into a grand mean for each group (i.e. Patients and separately, Controls) for each cell.
Exact percentages are shown in Figure S1, while percentages here are represented by a color scale. Each cell of Figure 3.C presents the patient-minus-
control difference of the corresponding cells of Figure 3.A and 3.B. Each cell of Figure 3.F presents the patient-CU-minus-control-NoCU difference of
the corresponding cells of Figure 3.D and 3.E. Pts=patients; Cts=controls; CU=utilizing questions 3,5,6 and 8 from the ICU we determined whether
subjects would qualify for the Callous and Unemotional Specifier for Conduct Disorder recently proposed for inclusion in the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual-V (DSM-V); NoCU=not meeting the Callous and Unemotional Specifier.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036158.g003
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on Active Trials of the AlAn’s game (independent variable)
remained significant (p=0.02) while controlling for group (patient
vs. control), externalizing and internalizing problem scales from
the Youth Self Report, socioeconomic status, sex, age and race
(white vs. other) and ethnicity (Hispanic yes vs. no).
AlAn’s Game Performance
The AlAn’s game contained two types of Attention-Control Trials:
those in which the logical choice was to accept (gain to the subject, no
loss to the Red Cross) and those in which the logical choice was to
reject (loss to both the subject and the Red Cross). Patients and
controls accepted about 97.5% and 96.5% of the ‘‘logically-accept’’
trials (p=0.53), respectively, and 0.8% and 0.9% (p=0.99) of the
‘‘logically-reject’’ trials, respectively (similar results for patients with
CUand controlswithout CU, see Figure 3.D and 3.E; also see Figure
S1). This supports that patients and controls both attended to trial
contentandgenerallyactedlogicallywhennon-ambiguoustrialswere
presented. For Calculation Trials, in which subjects were asked ‘‘Is
the YOU number bigger?’’ patients and controls performed equally
well (patient mean 57.263.68 correct out of 60 Calculation Trials;
control mean 57.763.18; p=0.61) supporting that patients and
controls were equally able to recognize the relative numerical values
in the time allowed. Again similar results were seen for patients with
CU (56.6) and controls without CU (58.1; p=0.40).
Discussion
Our between-group and dimensional analyses support that
AlAn’s game outcomes are associated with severity of CU traits.
However, AlAn’s game outcomes did not correlate significantly
with severity of conduct problems, nor did these outcomes
discriminate patients with CP and controls without CP.
Examination of Figure 3.F suggests that for the AlAn’s game,
when reward to self is high and deductions from the charity
donation are low, group differences are negligible; generally
subjects in all groups often accepted them. However, differences
between groups are obvious for trials with large deductions from
the Red Cross donation or when ‘‘You’’ values were low. We see
this effect in our ANOVA analyses, where differences between
groups were more obvious with more-costly-to-Red-Cross and
low-benefit-to-You trials. We speculate that expanding the matrix
to include more severe losses from the Red Cross donation, or
including more trials from the upper right quadrant, might
strengthen group discrimination.
We carefully designed AlAn’s game to control for several factors
that could contribute to between-group differences while having
little to do with self-benefiting or antisocial tendencies. First,
groups might differ in their valuation of the ‘‘other’’. We
hypothesized that our ‘‘other’’, the Red Cross, would generally
be considered beneficent and similar responses on a visual
analogue rating across groups confirmed this was the case.
Table 3. Spearman’s rank-order correlations of AlAn’s game outcomes with callous and unemotional traits, and conduct problems
measures.
BOTH GROUPS (n=39)
You RC APSDCall ICUTot CPCBCL CPYSR
You 1 20.95** 0.44** 0.44** 0.06 0.10
RC 1 20.51** 20.54** 20.14 20.16
APSDCall 1 0.76** 0.54** 0.47**
ICUTot 1 0.32* 0.51**
CPCBCL 1 0.64**
WITHIN PATIENTS (n=20)
You RC APSDCall ICUTot CPCBCL CPYSR
You 1 20.90** 0.35 0.29 20.07 0.001
RC 1 20.43 20.40 0.06 0.01
APSDCall 1 0.75** 0.06 0.18
ICUTot 1 20.02 0.42
CPCBCL 1 20.27
WITHIN CONTROLS (n=19)
You RC APSDCall ICUTot CPCBCL CPYSR
You 1 20.96** 0.48* 0.41 20.16 20.24
RC 1 20.51* 20.51* 0.12 0.17
APSDCall 1 0.68** 0.12 0.07




Abbreviations: APSD=Antisocial Process Screening Device; Call=Callousness subscale; CPCBCL=Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-oriented conduct problems scale T-
score from the CBCL; CPYSR=Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-oriented conduct problems scale T-score from the Youth Self Report; ICU=Inventory of Callous and
Unemotional Traits; RC=remaining balance in the Red Cross donation at the end of the game; Tot=total score; You=money taken for self while playing the AlAn’s
game.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036158.t003
AlAn’s Game, CP and CU
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e36158Second, groups might have differed in their attention to the game
or in their ability to understand relative values in the time allowed;
however, we have shown the groups did not significantly differ in
Attention-Control or Calculation Trial performance. Third, given
that patients differ from controls in decisions requiring assessment
of risk [47], patients might have engaged in highly self-benefiting
behaviors because they thought harm to others was unlikely. Thus,
by design, we carefully told subjects what outcomes would occur.
Fourth, adolescent patients with conduct and substance problems
may act impulsively [48]. Thus, we required subjects to wait
5 seconds before responding to trials. Other work among
antisocial adults has suggested that instituting such a delay
normalizes such subjects’ reversal learning [49]. Fifth, we required
abstinence from drugs and alcohol, thereby excluding very recent
drug use as a contributor to group differences. Finally, we
presented subjects with the same series of choices (same
opportunity) and minimized extraneous stimulation in a private,
quiet environment, while using a novel situation, devoid of peer
influences.
Understanding the link between AlAn’s and CU
Our results raise the question of why AlAn’s game outcomes are
related to the construct of CU traits. We posit that AlAn’s game
captures information about CU traits because it requires decision-
making in a socially relevant context where subjects must weigh
competing interests: benefit to self vs. harm to another. Work from
multiple groups suggests that youth with CP and CU have
difficulty reading the emotional states of others (e.g. deficits in
processing displays of fear) [50,51], demonstrate less emotional
empathy, positive affect [8], and less empathic concern, are less
able to take another’s perspective [32] and exhibit deficits in
emotional processing [12] and moral reasoning [13]. Some suggest
that youth with CP and CU, because of these emotional deficits,
are less able to learn from others’ responses to their actions,
impacting conscience development [14]. Perhaps because of this
poor emotional responsivity and diminished autonomic reactivity
to provocation [9] such youth are less likely to constrain behaviors
which cause distress to others [13]. In the AlAn’s game subjects
must decide whether to constrain self-benefiting behaviors because
of potential cost to a beneficent other. Thus, engagement of moral
beliefs and emotional processing is likely part of decision-making
in AlAn’s game.
Although we wondered whether some patients would be
motivated toward other-harmful behaviors, our results do not
support this on average for patients or patients with CU. First, if
that were the case, we would have expected strong patient-control
differences in the ‘‘logically-reject’’ Attention-Control Trials (i.e.
‘‘You’’ lose 2 cents and ‘‘RC’’ loses 32 cents). Acceptance rates on
such Attention-Control Trials were quite low for all groups. In
addition, if one examines each row of Figure 3 (A, B, D and E),
moving from left to right where the loss to RC increases there is a
quite systematic decline of percent of ‘‘Yes’’ responses to Active
Trials. If patients were motivated to harm others, we would expect
the opposite; in other words, while holding benefit-to-self constant
and increasing harm to others, those motivated toward other-harm
would be more likely, not less likely, to accept. We also wondered,
given the literature on empathy and conscience development,
whether patients would have only been motivated by self-benefit
and disregarded or been unmotivated by other-harm. Examina-
tion of Figures 3.A and 3.D again show that while holding self
benefit constant, increasing levels of cost-to-others reduced the
likelihood of accepting a trial.
Instead, we would conceptualize our results as supporting that
patients and controls go through similar deliberations, but that
patients, compared to controls, either more highly value a given
benefit to self, undervalue a given harm to others, or both.
Unfortunately, although the interactions in our ANOVA analyses
attempt to address this question, our design does not allow us to
absolutely disentangle this concern.
Limitations
Our results must be interpreted within the context of the study
limitations. First, the study sample is modest in size. However,
even with modest samples we demonstrate a significant relation-
ship between AlAn’s game outcomes and CU trait severity.
Second, tests of discrimination were conducted with a clinic-
referred sample and a selected control sample. Results must be
extrapolated with great caution to youths with CP and CU in
community samples. Our analyses, especially correlation analyses,
require replication in unselected samples. Third, the sample is
cross-sectional and we cannot determine whether AlAn’s game
performance has any predictive validity for future offending,
violence or aggression. Fourth, we utilized only self-report
measures of CU. However, such an approach is widely used in
the research literature [11]; self report is stable across time and is
moderately correlated with parent reports [52]. Use of self-reports
is also in some ways advantageous because antisocial attitudes and
behaviors may not be as evident to observers, parental reports may
be difficult to obtain from the most dysfunctional families and
validity of self-report increases from childhood through adoles-
cence, while validity of parent/teacher reports decrease [52]. Fifth,
the amounts of money during each choice in the AlAn’s game are
small. Based on our debriefing interviews, these amounts appeared
to be motivating for most adolescent subjects and our behavioral
data strongly indicate that the adolescents did believe that the Red
Cross would lose something of value if they made certain choices.
For example, each horizontal row of Figures 3A and 3B shows a
quite systematic decline in acceptance rates as the offers involved
greater losses to the Red Cross. Sixth, although the AlAn’s game
development benefited from previous work on altruism, we did not
include any trials in the game with a loss to the subject and gain to
the charity; instead our interests squarely focused on whether or
not subjects pursued possible self-benefiting behaviors despite
consequences to others. Seventh, in our between-group analyses, it
is impossible to rule out a relationship between CP and AlAn’s
game outcomes because many of our adolescent patients with CP
also had CU. Although our dimensional analyses help in this
regard, future studies might recruit and compare more balanced
groups based on presence and absence of CP and CU. Eighth,
because of the large number of statistical tests run, our results must
be interpreted with some caution; however, our analyses addressed
two main questions, whether AlAn’s game was associated with CP
and separately, CU. The consistency of our results strengthens our
confidence in the study findings. Ninth, our correlations across-
group must be interpreted cautiously as group differences in
callousness might inflate or artificially create significant correla-
tions; however, our within-group correlations are consistent with
those results, showing similar direction and magnitude of
association, increasing confidence in results of our dimensional
analyses. Finally, while it is possible that subjects’ behavior while
playing the AlAn’s game influenced their self report on measures
of callous unemotional traits, the relatively high stability of these
scores across childhood and adolescence [11] suggests that scores
are not markedly influenced by very recent behaviors or
experiences. However, future studies might include parent reports
of youths’ CU traits, or more remotely completed self-reports, to
address this important issue.
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In this preliminary study of the AlAn’s game, adolescents with
conduct problems and CU traits, compared with controls without
CP/CU, were disposed to benefit themselves while harming others
even in a novel situation, devoid of peer influences, where
anonymity is assured, reciprocity or retribution are impossible,
intoxication is absent, when the ‘‘other’’ to be harmed is
considered beneficent, and when opportunity is equal across all
individuals. AlAn’s game scores were associated with measures of
CU and therefore may provide an objective measure of CU.
Future studies using larger samples with groups balanced on CP
and CU are needed to precisely characterize and confirm the
associations between the AlAn’s game results and CU and other
aspects of externalizing behavior. The AlAn’s game might be
modified in various ways to extend work presented here; for
example, future work might (1) include trials with a higher
magnitude of costs-to-others, (2) include a second player as the
other, rather than a charity or (3) simultaneously assess tendency
toward altruistic behaviors (giving up something to benefit others)
and behaviors that provide self-benefit while costing others. Future
studies may also utilize the AlAn’s game or similar paradigms to
study the neural activation patterns during self-other consider-
ations.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Percentage of ‘‘Yes’’ answers to trials by
group. Matrix with ‘‘You Gain’’ values (Y axis) and ‘‘Red Cross
Loses’’ values (X axis) in cents. Each cell in the matrix represents a
single offer. The first column and top row of the matrix are
Attention-Control Trials (see Methods). For each cell, each
subject’s percent of ‘‘Yes’’ responses was calculated across the 2
sessions. Those values were entered into a grand mean for each
group (i.e. Patients and separately, Controls) for each cell. Figure
S1.A, S1.B. S1.C and S1.D correspond to manuscript Figures 3.A,
3.B, 3.D and 3.E, respectively.
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